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Comments
PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND INSPECTION - NEW CRIMINAL
RULES FOR PENNSYLVANIA
I.

INTRODUCTION

On June 29, 1977, Chief Justice Eagen of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court signed an order which repromulgated certain rules of criminal
procedure in the commonwealth,' among which was a rule establishing new
procedures for pretrial discovery and inspection.2 The new discovery rule,
rule 305, effective January 1, 1978, greatly liberalizes pretrial inspections in
criminal cases 3 and, in so doing, represents a substantial change in the
philosophical approach toward the criminal justice system.4 This article will
first discuss the changes made in the rule and compare the commonwealth's
new rule 305 to its federal counterpart, rule 16 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. A comparison of the new rule with its civil counterparts
at both the state and federal levels will follow. The article will conclude with
an attempt to project the impact the changes will have on the criminal
justice system in Pennsylvania.
II.

THE OLD RULE

A.

vs

THE NEW RULE

The Old Rule

Rule 310 (old rule) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure
reads as follows:
All applications of a defendant for pretrial discovery and inspection
shall be made not less than five days prior to the scheduled date of trial.
The court may order the attorney for the Commonwealth to permit the
defendant or his attorney, and such persons as are necessary to assist
him, to inspect and copy or photograph any written confessions and
written statements made by the defendant. No other discovery or
inspection shall be ordered except upon proof by the defendant, after
hearing, of exceptional circumstances and compelling reasons. The
order shall specify the time, place and manner of making discovery or

inspection and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are
necessary and proper. In no event, however, shall the court order

1. Order Amending and Repromulgating Certain Rules of Criminal Procedure:

Chapter 300 and Rules 203, 221, 230, 1122, 1124, 1125 and 1405, No. 78 (Pa., June 29,
1977).

2. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305 (amending Pa. R. Crim. P. 310, PA. STAT. ANN., Rules of
Crim. P. (Purdon Pamphlet 1977)).
3. See notes 21-134 and accompanying text infra.
4. For a discussion of the old rule and its limitations in criminal cases, see
Ranney, Criminal Discovery in Pennsylvania, 79 DICK. L. REV. 1 (1974).
(308)
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pretrial discovery or inspection of written
statements of witnesses in the
5
possession of the Commonwealth.
Basically, the old rule did not mandate production of any evidence on
the part of either prosecutor or defendant.6 If application was made to the
court for such discovery, it was within the court's discretion to order
compliance with the request or to deny it.' Even if production were
compelled, defendant was entitled to nothing more than his own written
statements or written confessions.' The courts were often faced with the
question of whether defendant had the right to obtain statements made by
him but embodied in a report written by someone else - a report neither
signed nor officially adopted by him. 9
Whether or not more could be compelled hinged on the terms that
conditioned an exception - "exceptional circumstances and compelling

5. Pa. R. Crim. P. 310, PA. STAT. ANN., Rules of Crim. P. (Purdon Pamphlet 1977)
(current version at PA. R. CRIM. P. 305).
6. Id. The comment which followed rule 310 read:
Pennsylvania has no statutory provisions dealing with pretrial discovery and
inspection in criminal cases. The extensive use of pretrial discovery in civil cases
could not be extended to criminal cases. The rule therefore permits the
discretionary grant of discovery to the defendant in the narrow area of the
defendant's own confession or written statements.
This rule was adopted in light of Commonwealth v. Caplan, 411 Pa. 563
(1963). Pa. R. Crim. P. 310, PA. STAT. ANN., Rules of Crim. P. (Purdon Pamphlet 1977),
Comment PA. STAT. ANN., Rules of Crim. P. (Purdon Pamphlet 1977) (emphasis in
original) (current version at PA. R. CRIM. P. 305).
In Caplan,the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was concerned about the scope
of pretrial discovery in criminal cases. 411 Pa. 563, 568, 192 A.2d 894,896 (1963). Then
Chief Justice Bell said,
[T]he questions herein raised are so very important, and because of recent
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States are so frequently presented
in criminal cases, and yet the law in this field is so uncertain, that they should be
speedily raised and speedily decided by an appellate Court.

Id.
The court dismissed the prosecutor's petition for a writ of mandamus but
stayed the criminal proceedings in the lower court to allow the prosecutor to file a
petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent the lower court from enforcing its grant of
approval of defendant's petition for pretrial discovery. Id. at 569, 192 A.2d at 897. The
judicial rule arising our of Caplan - that very limited pretrial discovery be allowed in
criminal cases - was codified as rule 310.
7. The use of the word "may" signals a discretionary duty rather than a
mandatory one.
8. Pa. R. Crim. P. 310, PA. STAT. ANN., Rules of Crim. P. (Purdon Pamphlet 1977)
(current version at PA. R. CRIM. P. 305).
9. The question arose in Commonwealth v. Barnes, 463 Pa. 259, 344 A.2d 821
(1975). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had to decide whether the court should
hear an interlocutory appeal from an order of a lower court compelling the prosecutor
to produce a criminal defendant's taped confession and police notes made during the
interrogation of the defendant. Id. at 260, 344 A.2d at 822 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting). In
a per curiam opinion, the court dismissed the interlocutory appeal as having been
improvidently granted. Id. at 260, 344 A.2d at 822. Justice Pomeroy, in a dissenting
opinion, argued that the appeal should have been heard and decided on the merits. Id.
at 261, 344 A.2d at 822 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting). He would have affirmed the lower
court's order to produce the tape recording because, "[like a writing, recordings are in
permanent form and indubitably pertain to the defendant." Id. at 263, 344 A.2d at 823
(Pomeroy, J., dissenting). As to production of the policeman's notes, Justice Pomeroy
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reasons."' 10 The Pennsylvania appellate courts routinely upheld lower courts'
denials of such additional requests for discovery for defendants' failure to
meet those conditions." What would constitute substantial compliance with
the conditions was not clear.' 2 The superior court defined the scope of the
condition as being coextensive with that which would be necessary and

would have reversed because he reasoned that "[s]uch notes [were] not the defendant's
statements but the police officer's recollection of what the defendant said." Id.
(footnote omitted).
Six months prior to Barnes, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had
confronted the question of whether or not the production of defendant's oral
statements embodied in an investigative officer's notes could be compelled under rule
310. Commonwealth v. Crawford, 461 Pa. 260, 336 A.2d 275 (1975). Justice O'Brien
agreed that the lower court was correct in holding that these notes were not written
statements as contemplated by rule 310. Id. at 264-65, 336 A.2d at 277. See also
Commonwealth v. Turra, 442 Pa. 192, 275 A.2d 96 (1971) (evidence of oral admissions
not producible absent a showing of exceptional circumstances and compelling
reasons).
10. Pa. R. Crim. P. 310, PA. STAT. ANN., Rules of Crim. P. (Purdon Pamphlet 1977)
(current version at PA. R. CRIM. P. 305). See text accompanying note 5 supra.
11. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Scott, 469 Pa. 258, 365 A.2d 140 (1976) (court held
that denial of discovery motion was not denial of due process); Commonwealth v. Gee,
467 Pa. 123, 354 A.2d 875 (1976) (court denied discovery based on defendant's failure
to show exceptional circumstances and compelling reasons); Commonwealth v.
Martin, 465 Pa. 134, 348 A.2d 391 (1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 923 (1976) (defendant
denied pretrial access to ballistics reports, fingerprints, notes of oral statements made
by defendant, and statements of coconspirators); Commonwealth v. Brown, 462 Pa.
578, 342 A.2d 84 (1975) (defendant's request for all of commonwealth's evidence
denied); Commonwealth v. Crawford, 461 Pa. 260, 336 A.2d 275 (1975) (defendant
denied production of his oral statement made to police and recorded in policeman's
notes); Commonwealth v. Bederka, 459 Pa. 653, 331 A.2d 181 (1975) (defendant denied
list of commonwealth's witnesses); Commonwealth v. Ware, 459 Pa. 334, 329 A.2d 258
(1974) (defendant denied list of commonwealth's witnesses); Commonwealth v. Smith,
457 Pa. 638, 326 A.2d 60 (1974) (district attorney's report on prospective jurors held not
discoverable); Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Shiomos, 457 Pa. 104, 320 A.2d 134
(1974) (court denied defendant's motion to compel production of hospital records of
rape victims); Appeal of Cowell, 243 Pa. Super. Ct. 177, 364 A.2d 718 (1976) (court held
that denial of defendant's discovery motion was not denial of due process);
Commonwealth v. Galloway, 238 Pa. Super. Ct. 69, 352 A.2d 518 (1975) (defendant
denied access to juror investigation report); Commonwealth v. Mervin, 230 Pa. Super.
Ct. 552, 326 A.2d 602 (1974) (defendant denied pretrial discovery for failure to show
exceptional circumstances and compelling reasons); Commonwealth v. Foster, 219 Pa.
Super. Ct. 127, 280 A.2d 602 (1971) (court denied defendant's request for investigation
report on potential jurors).
12. Some of the reasons rejected by the court as not falling within this condition
were: 1) that names of witnesses were needed for purposes of voir dire to insure the
impartiality of the jury, Commonwealth v. Brown, 462 Pa. 578, 587-88 n.7, 342 A.2d
84, 89 n.7 (1975); 2) that a summary of police action was needed to inform defense
counsel about a lineup in which defendant participated and by which defendant was
identified, id.; 3) that defendant was out of state contesting extradition which delayed
his getting into the defense of his Pennsylvania prosecution, Commonwealth v.
Martin, 465 Pa. 134, 164 n.17, 348 A.2d 391, 406 n.17 (1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 923
(1976); 4) that defendant suffered from an "untutored and impecunious condition in
life," id.; and 5) that medical records of rape victims were needed because such
"records are of a technical nature and expert advice 'might be needed'," Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Shiomos, 457 Pa. 104, 110, 320 A.2d 134, 137 (1974).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1978

3

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 3

1977-19781

COMMENTS

essential to a fair trial. 13 In Commonwealth v. Pritchett,14 the court held that
the name of a government informant was essential to a fair trial and should
have been disclosed to the defendant as part of pretrial discovery.' 5 The
court affirmed the dismissal of the case because of the commonwealth's
refusal to disclose the name.'6 Although the Pritchett definition indicated
that information and materials which were necessary and essential to a fair
trial would always meet the conditions of rule 310, query whether "necessary
and essential to a fair trial" is any less ambiguous and any less subject to
arbitrary application than "exceptional circumstances and compelling
17
reasons."
The pre-1978 criminal defendant, then, was statutorily entitled to very
little information by means of pretrial discovery, and that entitlement was
not absolute but was subject to the discretion of the court.'6 Not only was he
limited in what he could affirmatively request, but the courts were
specifically forbidden to permit him to discover statements of witnesses.' 9
13. Commonwealth v. Pritchett, 225 Pa. Super. Ct. 401, 312 A.2d 434 (1973). There
the court stated:
[A] motion judge's conclusion that disclosure of an informant's identity is
necessary and essential to a fair trial is tantamount to a finding that there are
"exceptional circumstances and compelling reasons" within Rule 310. Such an
exception to a rule generally prohibiting discovery is required where disclosure is
based upon considerations of fairness that have constitutional dimensions.
Id. at 410, 312 A.2d at 439.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had held, however, that the denial of
pretrial discovery, absent satisfaction of the conditions of rule 310, was not a
deprivation of due process under the fourteenth amendment. Commonwealth v. Scott,
469 Pa. 258, 265, 365 A.2d 140, 143 (1976); Commonwealth v. Turra, 442 Pa. 192, 196,
275 A.2d 96, 97-98 (1971).
14. 225 Pa. Super. Ct. 401, 312 A.2d 434 (1973).
15. Id. at 409-11, 312 A.2d at 439-40. For a general discussion of the problems
concerning the disclosure of identity of informants, see Ranney, supra note 4, at 6-8.
16. 225 Pa. Super. Ct. at 409-11, 312 A.2d at 439-40.
17. Pa. R. Crim. P. 310, PA. STAT. ANN., Rules of Crim. P. (Purdon Pamphlet 1977)
(current version at PA. R. CRIM. P. 305). See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court in a case which guaranteed a right to
jury trial to state criminal defendants if such a right would be afforded under the
sixth amendment if the defendant were in federal court. 391 U.S. at 149. Justice White
and Justice Harlan, who dissented, disagreed as to what constituted "fair" procedures
in the American scheme of justice. Compare 391 U.S. at 151-58 (White, J.) with id. at
173-93 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
18. See note 7 supra.
19. Pa. R. Crim. P. 310, PA. STAT. ANN., Rules of Crim. P. (Purdon Pamphlet 1977)
(current version at PA. R. CRIM. P. 305). This refusal to allow defendant access to
witnesses' statements was applicable only before trial. In Commonwealth v. Kontos,
442 Pa. 343, 276 A.2d 830 (1971), the supreme court held that witnesses' statements
should be given to defense counsel after the witnesses had testified at trial. Id. at
347-51, 276 A.2d at 832-34. Justice Jones concluded that
traditional rationales for limiting or prohibiting pretrial discovery in criminal
cases [did] not extend to the at-trial situation. . . . Once the Commonwealth's
witnesses have appeared at trial, their personal safety and freedom from
potential intimidation are in no way enhanced by denying to the defendant
access to their pretrial statements. Nor would the granting of such access to the
defendant heighten his opportunity for successful perjury.
Id. at 349, 276 A.2d at 833.
Following Kontos, it was believed by most prosecutors that only those parts of
witnesses' prior statements which related to their direct testimony had to be produced

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol23/iss2/3

4

Lamb: Pretrial Discovery and Inspection - New Criminal Rules for Pennsy

312

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

23

There are a number of indications from the bench that the judiciary was
unhappy with this restrictive and sometimes ambiguous pretrial discovery
rule. 20 This dissatisfaction, among other things, was the impetus for
bringing about the new rule.
at trial. This rationale was predicated on the following dictum in Commonwealth v.
Swierczewski, 215 Pa. Super. Ct. 130, 257 A.2d 336 (1969): "[D]efense access [to prior
statements of Commonwealth witnesses] is subject to the control of the trial court,
which must review the requested documents and may permit access only to those
portions relevant to matters raised in direct examination." Id. at 135, 257 A.2d at 339
(dictum).
This rationale was challenged and defeated in Commonwealth v. Hamm, Pa. -, 378 A.2d 1219 (1977). In the Hamm case, the prosecution had withheld two
witnesses' statements. Id. at __,
378 A.2d at 1224. The trial judge reviewed the
complete statement, agreed with the prosecutor that the omitted statements were not
relevant to the direct testimony, and denied defense counsel access to them. Id. at
378 A.2d at 1224, The supreme court held on appeal that the complete
statements of the witness must be turned over, not to the judge, but to defense counsel
in the first instance. Id. at -, 378 A.2d at 1226. Only the defense counsel, said the
court, can determine whether the information in the statement is helpful. Id. at -,
378 A.2d at 1225. In Hamm, the court remanded to the trial court to determine
whether the withholding of the parts of the two statements was harmless error. Id. at
-,
378 A.2d at 1227.
20. In Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Shiomos, 457 Pa. 104, 320 A.2d 134 (1974),
several members of the court expressed opinions that the rules for pretrial discovery
in criminal cases should be liberalized. Justice Eagen advocated change by
amendment, saying:
There is no question good arguments can be made for the proposition that
the pre-trial discovery rules should be liberalized. The fact is, however, Rule 310
is the rule of criminal procedure in this Commonwealth and it must be followed
by the trial courts as long as it is the rule in force. If the criminal procedure rules
are to be liberalized, this should be done in the proper manner, namely, by
amendment. If the rules are liberalized on a case by case basis by this Court, or
by individual interpretation by lower court judges, the inevitable result would be
judicial inconsistency and confusion. The undesirability and unfairness of this
result is self-evident.
Id. at 110, 320 A.2d at 137.
Justice Pomeroy recommended a study of the federal rule governing pretrial
disclosure in criminal cases:
While the trend of recent writing appears to have been in favor of increasing the
range of permissible discovery, it must be acknowledged that "the extent to
which pre-trial discovery should be permitted in criminal cases is a complex and
controversial issue." Note of Advisory Committee on 1966 Amendments to Rule
16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 175 (1966). Without here
engaging in extended discussion of the subject, I, for one, see merit in a rule
which would permit inspection by a defendant of records or reports of physical or
mental examinations in the possession of the government made in connection
with a particular case, and which are relevant. This is in line with the amended
Federal Rule 16(a), which indeed would bear study in its entirety in connection
with any revision of our own rule.
Id. at 111, 320 A.2d at 137-38 (Pomeroy, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
Justice Nix agreed with the other two justices by emphasizing "the need to
liberalize [the] rules of pre-trial discovery in criminal cases" and by commending "the
trial courts' action [in] highlighting that need." Id. at 112, 320 A.2d at 138 (Nix, J.,
concurring).
See also Commonwealth v. Mervin, 230 Pa. Super. Ct. 552, 326 A.2d 602 (1974),
in which the superior court acknowledged that the supreme court was in favor of
liberalizing the discovery rules. Id. at 558, 326 A.2d at 605. In Mervin, the court
affirmed the trial court's conviction for subornation of perjury and conspiracy after
finding that the lower court's denial of pretrial discovery to the defendant was

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1978

5

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 3

1977-19781

COMMENTS

B.
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The New Rule

1. Informal
The new rule, rule 305, is divided into seven parts which will be
discussed separately. Section A of the rule calls for both prosecutor and
defense counsel to make good faith efforts to seek and to achieve discovery
21
on an informal basis before asking assistance of the court:
Before any disclosure or discovery can be sought under these rules by
either party, counsel for the parties shall make a good faith effort to
resolve all questions of discovery, and to provide information required or
requested under these rules as to which there is no dispute. When there
are items requested by one party which the other party has refused to
disclose, the demanding party may make appropriate motion to the
court. Such motion shall be made within fourteen (14) days after
arraignment, unless the time for filing is extended by the court. In such
motion the party must set forth the fact that a good faith effort to
discuss the requested material has taken place and proved unsuccessful.
Nothing in this provision shall delay the disclosure of any items agreed
upon by the parties pending resolution of any motion for discovery. 22
No conditions are placed on the authority of the court to extend the time for
filing. Whether it would be granted automatically on motion of one of the
parties or on the court's own motion, or whether the court would require a
showing of reasonable conditions is not clear.
2.

Disclosure by the Commonwealth

Section B(1) of rule 305 describes what the prosecutor must turn over to
23
the defense counsel:
(1) MANDATORY: In all court cases, on request by the defendant,
and subject to any protective order which the Commonwealth might
obtain under this rule, the Commonwealth shall disclose to the
defendant's attorney all of the following requested items or information,
provided they are material to the instant case. The Commonwealth
shall, when applicable, permit the defendant's attorney to inspect and
24
copy or photograph such items.
properly based on the absence of any showing of exceptional circumstances or
compelling reasons to justify production of the requested materials. Id. at 559, 563, 326
A.2d at 606, 608.
21. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305A.
22. Id. The arraignment which triggers the fourteen-day filing period is the

formal arraignment, or a substitute proceeding in some judicial districts. It is not the
preliminary arraignment which must be held within six hours of defendant's arrest.
The six-hour rule was propounded in Commonwealth v. Davenport, - Pa. __, 370
A.2d 301 (1977). The timing and manner of conducting these formal arraignments
which follow a preliminary hearing and precede trial are found in rule 303 of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. PA. R. CRIM. P. 303 (amending Pa. R.
Crim. P. 317, PA. STAT. ANN., Rules of Crim. P. (Purdon Pamphlet 1977)).

23. PA. R.

CRIM.

P. 305B(1).

24. Id.
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Although this section is captioned MANDATORY, production of all the
items subsequently enumerated is subject to any protective order which the
prosecutor may obtain. Protective orders are discussed in the portion of this
comment dealing with section F of the new rule, 25 but it should be noted that
compelled production of certain information by the commonwealth fails to
be the certainty that some prosecutors and defense attorneys initially
believed it would. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the supreme
court did intend the rule to be mandatory except under special circumstances. Not only does the caption so read, but the verb used in the section is
"shall disclose" rather than the discretionary "may disclose. '26
There are specific conditions which defense counsel must meet, however,
in order to be entitled to receive certain materials. Initially, he must request
them.2 7 There is no affirmative duty on the prosecutor to turn over anything
unsolicited other than material mandated by the Supreme Court case, Brady
v. Maryland,2 that is, material in the possession and control of the
prosecutor that may be favorable to the defendant. 29 Secondly, the requested
items must be material to the instant case. 3 When there is a dispute as to
materiality, the court may ask that the items in dispute be delivered to them
for an in camera inspection to determine whether or not the items are
3
material. 1
Section B(1)(a) is a restatement of the Brady doctrine.3 2 It requires that
the commonwealth produce "[any evidence favorable to the accused which
25. See notes 122-25 and accompanying text infra.
26. PA. R.
27. Id.

CRIM. P.

305B(1).

28. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In Brady, the Supreme Court held that the withholding of

an exculpatory statement which was made by defendant's alleged coconspirator and
was in the possession of the prosecutor, was a denial of due process under the
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 86-87. There remained after Brady the question of
whether or not there was an affirmative duty on the part of the prosecution to disclose
exculpatory material or whether, to use Justice Douglas's words, the violation
occurred when there was "suppression by the prosecution ... upon (accused's]
request ...." Id. at 87 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court itself acknowledged that this was still an unanswered
question in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). Justice Stevens, in delivering
the opinion of the Court, said, "[T]his Court has not yet decided whether the
prosecutor has any obligation to provide defense counsel with exculpatory information when no request has been made." Id. at 106. Later, in discussing the nature of
particular items of evidence, he added, "[Ilf the evidence is so clearly supportive of a
claim of innocence that it gives the prosecution notice of a duty to produce, that duty
should equally arise even if no request is made." Id. at 107. Therefore, absent a
request, the prosecutor still has a duty to turn over material or information that would
create a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt, a doubt that would not exist absent
the material. Id. at 112-13. In Agurs, the Court found that the failure of the prosecutor
to turn over to defense counsel the victim's arrest record did not deprive the defendant
of a fair trial. Id. at 114.
See also Commonwealth v. Royster, - Pa. -,
372 A.2d 1194 (1977)
(holding that neither Brady nor rule 310 required disclosure of the complete police
investigative file); Ranney, supra note 4, at 10-12.
29. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112-13 (1976); note 28 supra.
30. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(1).
31. Id. 305F. The courts may use such an in camera proceeding to settle any
disputes over discoverability.
32. See note 28 supra.
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is material either to guilt or to punishment, and which is within the
possession or control of the attorney for the Commonwealth. '3 A
prosecutor, however, could not rely upon rule 305 to withhold such material
34
because it was not requested or because it was subject to a protective order.
Withholding of such material has been held by the Supreme Court of the
United States to be a denial of due process under the United States
Constitution, 5 and such a rule of constitutional law supersedes any
36
procedural rule promulgated by a state court.
Subsection B(1)(b) mandates the production of "any written confession
or inculpatory statement or the substance of any oral confession or
inculpatory statement, and the identity of the person to whom the
confession or inculpatory statement was made, which is in the possession or
control of the attorney for the Commonwealth." 37 This provision raises the
interesting question of what is meant by "the substance of any oral
confession or inculpatory statement."3 8 Could this mean any such statement
embodied in a policeman's notes or a district attorney's report? 39 Does it
include witnesses' statements if the defendant made inculpatory remarks to
them? The scope of this clause will ultimately have to be determined by the
courts.
The next four subsections appear to be relatively straightforward as to
what disclosure is required of the commonwealth:
(c) the defendant's prior criminal record;
(d) the circumstances and results of any identification of the
defendant by voice, photograph, or in-person identification;
(e) results or reports of scientific tests, expert opinions, and written
or recorded reports of polygraph examinations or other physical or
mental examinations of the defendant, which are within the possession
or control of the attorney for the Commonwealth;
33. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(1)(a).
34. In the comments following rule 305 is the following statement:
It should also be noted that as to material which is discretionary with the court,
or which is not enumerated in the rule, if such information contains exculpatory
evidence as would come under the Brady rule, it must be disclosed. Nothing in
this rule is intended to limit in any way disclosure of evidence constitutionally
required to be disclosed.
PA. R. CRIM. P. 305, Comment.
35. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86-88 (1963). See note 28 supra.
36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The amendment provides in part: "No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law." Id. Therefore, if a state official acting under
color of law suppresses exculpatory material, he is in violation of the amendment.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86-88 (1963). No state procedural rule can divest a
defendant of his constitutional rights which were recognized under Brady.
37. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(1)(b).
38. Id.
39. See note 9 and accompanying text supra. There does not seem to be a bar in
the rule itself which would preclude such production. Even though an attorney's
reports might be subject to the work product immunity, see notes 126-34 and
accompanying text infra, the immunity is partial and would not cover the substance
of defendant's statements embodied in such a report. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305G.
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(f) any tangible objects, including documents, photographs, fingerprints, or other tangible evidence;40

Subsections (1)(a), (b), and (e) all refer to production of things that are in
the possession or control of the attorney for the commonwealth.41 Over
whom and over what does the state prosecutor have control? In Commonwealth v. Smith,4 2 defense counsel requested that the trial court issue a
subpoena duces tecum compelling the Federal Bureau of Investigation to
turn over statements which two prosecution witnesses had made to federal
agents.4 3 The trial court refused the request after being informed by a
44
representative of the F.B.I. that the Bureau would not produce the reports.
On appeal from conviction, the supreme court noted that "it was the F.B.I.
and not the Commonwealth which denied [defendant] access to the
information in question." 45 The court stated, "The Commonwealth is no
more to blame for the unavailability of the F.B.I. reports than if a witness
beyond the reach of process refused to voluntarily appear and testify on
behalf of [defendant]. ' 4 6 In addition, the court agreed with the state
prosecutor that the substance of the statements made to the federal agents
was available to the defendant through statements made to the state
prosecutor by the same witnesses. 47 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari, and the Smith case was remanded by it to the state
supreme court for reconsideration.48 On remand, the court held that the sixth
and fourteenth amendments to the federal Constitution required that the
49
defendant be granted access to the statements.
Does the inclusion of the limiting factor in subsections B(1)(a), (b), and
(e) mean that there is some duty imposed on the prosecutor under the other
subsections to produce items or information which are not within his
40. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(1)(c)-(f).
41. Id. 305B(1)(a), (b), (e).
42. 412 Pa. 1, 192 A.2d 671 (1963), cert. granted and remanded, 376 U.S. 354
(1964), (per curiam), rev'd, 417 Pa. 321, 208 A.2d 219 (1965).
43. 412 Pa. at 2-3, 192 A.2d at 671.
44. Id. at 3, 192 A.2d at 672.
45. Id. at 4, 192 A.2d at 672.
46. Id. at 4, 192 A.2d at 672.
47. Id. at 4, 192 A.2d at 672-73.
48. 376 U.S. 354 (per curiam). See 417 Pa. 321, 328, 208 A.2d 219, 222-23 (1965).
49. Id. at 329, 208 A.2d at 223. Justice Musmanno concluded:
Smith had the right to, and great need for, the statements he requested. The 6th
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States guarantees to the accused
the right "to have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and
to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." While this Amendment is
directed to federal criminal prosecutions, the Supreme Court of the United States
held in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, that that part of the 6th Amendment
requiring assistance of counsel is binding on the States. Since the process sought
to be here invoked had to do with documents in possession of the Federal
government, the 6th Amendment would apply, and a refusal to comply with the
mandate would amount to denial of due process guaranteed under the 14th
Amendment.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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control, or is the question mooted because of the Smith holding, especially if
the party in control of the material sought to be produced is some agency of
the federal government?50
Subsection B(1)(g) mandates the disclosure of "the transcripts and
recordings of any electronic surveillance, and the authority by which the
said transcripts and recordings were obtained.""1 In Pennsylvania, the
nonconsensual use of such electronic surveillance is a misdemeanor of the
second degree. 52 There is a narrowly drawn exception for state and local law
enforcement officers in situations in which their personal safety is in
jeopardy: 53 they must be on duty; they also must first obtain court approval;
and recordation is prohibited. 4 Given that there can be no lawful

50. Smith seems to indicate that this latter interpretation might be the case. Id. at
331-32, 208 A.2d at 224-25. The court directed itself to the federal-state problem when

it said:
If the case at bar were being tried in a federal court, there can be no question that
the FBI statements here under focal attention would be supplied to the defendant
and they would be used at the trial. Nor can there be any surmise that if the
Sweet and Corcoran statements had been collected by the Pennsylvania State
Police, this Court would order the State Police to surrender the statements to the
defendant for his trial in the State court. With this irrefutable premise, it can
only be a paradox beyond compare to say that, because this case adds up the
guarantees of both Federal and State governments, that the total is less than the
individual parts; that while Smith would be allowed federal documents in a
federal court and state documents in a state court, he cannot, with both the
Federal and State governments looking on, obtain a federal document to use in a
state court, where his basic constitutional rights, both Federal and State, are
involved. The law sometimes take [sic] illogical turns, but this Court could not
permit anything so illogical and so fundamentally unfair to take lodgment in the
State Reports of this Commonwealth.
Id, at 332, 208 A.2d at 225.
One could hypothesize a situation in which there were concurrent criminal
investigations being pursued by the respective state and federal law enforcement
agencies. If a state defendant requested what he alleged to be material information
under rule 305B(1), but which information was under the control of the federal
investigators, would the state courts impose a requirement upon the state prosecutor
to produce the item or be subject to sanctions? Although this interpretation seems
harsh, a literal reading of the rule can produce just such a conclusion. Given the
Smith case, perhaps the problem of "who has control" is irrelevant, and concepts of
proper federalism restraints should yield to a doctrine fashioned to protect an
individual's constitutional rights. See also Commonwealth v. Friday, 171 Pa. Super.
Ct. 397, 406-07, 90 A.2d 856, 859-60 (1952) (state police records not deemed to be in
custody or control of district attorney).
51. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(1)(g).
52. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §5705 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
53. Id. § 5705(c)(3). The relevant section reads:
Duly appointed public Pennsylvania State and local law enforcement
officers in the performance of their law enforcement duties when acting pursuant
to an order of court issued in accordance with the provisions of subsection (d) of
this section. This exception shall be limited to those situations in which the
personal safety of such law enforcement officers is in jeopardy and shall not
include any right of recordation. The electronic recording of any conversation
overheard by electronic or mechanical means or other device in the exercise of
this exception shall not be admissible in any judicial or administrative
proceeding.
Id.
54. Id.
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transcripts and recordings of electronic surveillance in Pennsylvania, is the
requirement that the commonwealth be compelled to produce such unlawful
material therefore violative of the recorder's fifth amendment right not to be
compelled to be a witness against himself in any criminal case?5 5 This
section, too, awaits judicial clarification.
Following the list of items that the prosecution must turn over to defense
counsel is a list of other items that the court may or may not order to be
56
produced.
(2) DISCRETIONARY WITH THE COURT: In all court cases, if
the defendant files a motion for pretrial discovery, the court may order
the Commonwealth to allow the defendant's attorney to inspect and
copy or photograph any of the following requested items, upon a
showing that they are material to the preparation of the defense, and
that the request is reasonable:
(a) the names and addresses of eyewitnesses;
(b) all written or recorded statements, and substantially
verbatim oral statements, of eyewitnesses the Commonwealth
intends to call at trial;
(c) all written or recorded statements, and substantially
verbatim oral statements, made by co-defendants, and by coconspirators or accomplices, whether such individuals have been
charged or not;
55. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.

56. Although section B(2) confers discretionary power on the trial judge to compel
the production of certain materials, Chief Justice Jones in DiJoseph Petition, 394 Pa.
19, 145 A.2d 187 (1958), indicated that, under the old rule 310, discretion already was
lodged in the trial judge to permit defendant to examine certain evidence under

appropriate circumstances. Id. at 22, 145 A.2d at 188. (Jones, C. J., concurring). He
said, "[A] trial court having jurisdiction of an alleged offender possesses discretionary
power to permit a defendant, in appropriate circumstances, to examine and inspect in
advance of trial physical or documentary evidence in the hands of the prosecution."

Id.
In State v. Haas, 188 Md. 63, 51 A.2d 647 (1947), Chief Justice Marbury of the
Maryland Supreme Court spoke of the protective aspects of leaving certain questions
of pretrial discovery to the discretion of the trial judge:
There can be no doubt that the recognition of the right in a trial court to
permit the defendant to examine his confession in advance of the trial was not
recognized at common law. But law is a growth and a great many matters,
commonplace to us now, were not thought of many years ago. . . . [T]he
tendency in the courts of this country is to permit discretion in the trial judge.
The argument made against any such discretion is based upon a fear that the
State, which is charged with the prosecution of crime, may be hampered in its
duty by the disclosure of its evidence to those charged with offenses. Whatever
merit that argument has as applied to a situation where it is contended that the
accused has a right to inspect the evidence, it has no application, we think, to a
situation where the trial judge in each case and on each application, determines
what should be done in the interest of justice. There are cases in which it would
be clearly unjust to deny such an application and, on the other hand, cases are
conceivable in which it might improperly hamper the prosecution to grant such
an application.
Id. at 75-76, 51 A.2d at 653 (emphasis in original). See also Louisell, Criminal
Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 56, 98 (1961).
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(d) any other evidence specifically identified by the defendant,
provided the defendant can additionally
establish that its disclosure
57
would be in the interests of justice.
Again, the same two conditions attach as those applied to the
mandatory provision - that items must be requested and must be material
to the instant case. 58 One additional condition - that the request be
6
reasonable -9 as well as the use of the discretionary verb helper "may,"
are the only things that distinguish access to these items from access to the
mandatory items. A strict reading of the statute would lead one to assume
that a court could deny a motion for discovery under rule 305B(2) even
though the request was proper and reasonable and the items were material
to the instant case. An alternative reading of the statute, however, is that
reasonableness and materiality define the scope of the court's discretion,
and that to deny access to information after finding the request to be both
reasonable and material would be an abuse of that discretion.
Only names of eyewitnesses need be given, not names of all witnesses. 61
Written statements of those eyewitnesses the prosecution intends to call at
'62
Just
trial are producible as are "substantially verbatim oral statements.
as there will be confusion in determining what is meant by "the substance of
any oral confession or inculpatory statement" under subsection B(1)(b), 63 so
also will there be confusion as to what are "substantially verbatim oral
statements" under subsection B(2)(b). 64 Are all reports and records which
might include such statements discoverable even though they might be
classified as work product?65 Similar problems may arise in subsection

B(2)(c) which pertains to statements of codefendants, coconspirators, and
66
accomplices.
57. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(2)(a)-(d).
58. Id. 305B(2). See notes 28-31 and accompanying text supra.

59. PA. R.

CRIM.

P. 305B(2).

60. Id.
61. Id. 305B(2)(b).
62. Id. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
63. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(1)(b). See text accompanying note 37 supra.
64. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(2)(b). In Commonwealth v. Hustler, 243 Pa. Super.
Ct. 200, 364 A.2d 940 (1976), defendant, who had been convicted of rape, argued on
appeal that he had requested, for impeachment purposes, and had been denied use of
an investigator's report which contained a summary of the victim's formal statement.
Id. at -, 364 A.2d at 941. The court recognized that the prosecutor had turned over
to defense counsel the victim's formal statement and held that the investigative report
could not be considered a statement of the witness. Id. at -, 364 A.2d at 941.
65. Even under the old rule 310, see text accompanying note 5 supra, the court
was faced with the problem of materials only part of which were subject to discovery.
See Commonwealth v. Swierczewski, 215 Pa. Super. Ct. 130, 257 A.2d 336 (1969). In
Swierczewski, defendant alleged that the affidavit in support of a search warrant was
defective in that there was insufficient information given to justify a finding of
probable cause. Id. at 132, 257 A.2d at 337. He was denied access to the police reports
which contained the names of informants. Id. at 134, 257 A.2d at 338. Arguing that he
only wanted relevant portions of the file and not the names of the informants, he was
granted a new trial to allow discovery within those limitations. Id. at 134, 136, 257
A.2d at 338-39.
66. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(2)(c).
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It is subsection B(2)(d) that prosecutors fear may open the Pandora's
box of the commonwealth's evidence. A defendant may request "any other
evidence" conditioned only on specificity of the request and on proof that
disclosure is "in the interests of justice. '67 By putting the mandatory and
discretionary sections together without this last subsection, there seems to
be only one major category of information not subject to discovery - the
identity of and disclosure from nonexpert, noneyewitness witnesses whose
testimony does not fall within Brady material. 68 Can a defendant acquire
names and statements of such witnesses through subsection B(2)(d)?69 The
judiciary's treatment of defense requests under this subsection will reveal
whether the clause will be as broadly construed as prosecutors fear.
3. Disclosure by the Defendant
Defendants are likewise under a mandate to disclose certain material:
(a) Notice of Alibi Defense: A defendant who intends to offer the
defense of alibi at trial shall, at the time required for filing the omnibus
pretrial motion under Rule 306, file of record notice signed by the
defendant or the attorney for the defendant, with proof of service upon
the attorney for the Commonwealth, specifying intention to claim such
defense. Such notice shall contain specific information as to the place or
places where the defendant claims to have been at the time of the
alleged offense and the names and addresses of witnesses whom the
defendant intends to call in support of such claim.
(b) Notice of Insanity or Mental Infirmity Defense: A defendant
who intends to offer at trial the defense of insanity, or a claim of mental
infirmity, shall, at the time required for filing an omnibus pretrial
motion under Rule 306, file of record notice signed by the defendant or
the attorney for the defendant, with proof of service upon the attorney
for the Commonwealth, specifying intention to claim such defense. Such
notice shall contain specific available information as to the nature and
extent of the alleged insanity or claim of mental infirmity, and the
period of time which the defendant allegedly suffered from such insanity
or mental infirmity, and the names and addresses of witnesses, expert or
otherwise, whom the defendant intends to call at trial to establish such
defense.70

The notice of alibi defense has been a much debated provision in many
state and federal codes, and the controversies surrounding such rules
67. Id. 305B(2)(d).
68. See note 28 supra.
69. Two cases held, under old rule 310, that lists of witnesses were not
discoverable unless defendant alleged and proved exceptional circumstances and
compelling reasons. Commonwealth v,Bederka, 459 Pa. 653, 658, 331 A.2d 181, 183
(1975); Commonwealth v. Ware, 459 Pa. 334, 368-69, 329 A.2d 258, 275-76 (1974).
Those criteria were doubtless more stringent than the criteria established in rule
305B(2), that is, materiality, reasonableness, and proof that disclosure would be in the
interests of justice. PA. R. CraM. P. 305B(2)(d).
70. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305C(1)(a), (b).
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culminated in the Supreme Court's decision in Wardius v. Oregon.71 In
Wardius the Court held that a defendant could not be compelled to reveal an
alibi defense and the names of witnesses unless the statute provided for
reciprocity72 - that is, that the prosecutor would be compelled to disclose the
names of witnesses he intended to call to disprove defendant's alibi. 73 The
new Pennsylvania rule, unlike its predecessor,7 4 complies with Wardius in
75
subsection C(1)(c) by providing for reciprocity:
(c) Disclosure of Reciprocal Witnesses: Within seven (7) days after
service of such notice of alibi defense or of insanity or claim of mental
infirmity defense, or within such other time as allowed by the court upon
cause shown, the attorney for the Commonwealth shall disclose to the
71. 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
72. Id. at 472.

73. See id. at 471 & n.2. There are literally volumes written about notice of alibi
provisions in criminal procedure rules. Pennsylvania's predecessor to the new rule 305
in this area was rule 312:
Notice of Alibi Defense
(a) When a defendant intends to offer the defense of alibi at trial, he shall
at any time before or after indictment but not later than five days before trial,
file notice with proof of service on the attorney for the Commonwealth,
specifying his intention to claim such defense and giving the place where he will
claim to have been at the time of the alleged offense and the names and
addresses of the witnesses he intends to call in support of such claim.
(b) Unless the interests of justice require it, on a defense of alibi a
defendant may not call any witness not named in such notice, or any witness on
an alibi different from that alleged in the notice.
(c) A defendant may himself testify concerning an alibi notwithstanding he
has not filed notice, but if he has filed notice and testifies concerning his presence at the time of the offense at a place different from that specified in his
notice, he may be cross-examined concerning such notice.
(d) No adverse inference may be drawn against a defendant, nor may any
comment be made concerning his failure to call available alibi witnesses, where
such witnesses have been prevented from testifying by reason of this rule, unless
the defendant or his counsel shall attempt to explain such failure to the jury.
Pa. R Crim. P. 312, PA. STAT. ANN., Rules of Crim. P. (Purdon Pamphlet 1977)
(current version at PA. R. CRIM. P. 305C(1)(a), (d)).
In Commonwealth v. Jackson, 457 Pa. 79, 319 A.2d 161 (1974), defendant had
been convicted of armed robbery in a trial in which he had complied with the notice of
alibi provision, but the commonwealth had failed to reciprocate. Id. at 80-81, 319 A.2d
at 162. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed and granted a new
trial, holding that the commonwealth had a constitutional duty under Wardius to
reciprocate and disclose any witnesses whose testimony would tend to refute
defendant's alibi. Id. at 82, 319 A.2d at 163. Justice Eagen dissented, arguing that the
prosecution had no rebuttal witnesses and therefore none to disclose. Id. at 85, 319
A.2d at 164-65 (Eagen, J., dissenting). The new rule 305 requires the disclosure of
witnesses who will disprove and discredit defendant's proffered alibi testimony, PA. R.
CRIM. P. 305C(1)(c), but does not specifically cover the Jackson situation in which
there are no rebuttal witnesses. See id.
Justice Pomeroy dissented in Jackson, arguing that the commonwealth could
not be forced to disclose its witnesses and that the only sanction for failure to
reciprocate would be to preclude the commonwealth from enforcing the notice of alibi
provision against the defendant. 457 Pa. 79, 86-88, 319 A.2d 161, 165-66 (1974)
(Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
74. PA. R. CRIM P. 312, PA. STAT. ANN., Rules of Crim. P. (Purdon Pamphlet 1977)
(current version at PA. R. CRIM. P. 305C(1)(a), (d)). See note 73 supra.
75. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305C(1)(c).
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defendant the names and addresses of all persons the Commonwealth
intends to call as witnesses to disprove or discredit
the defendant's
76
claim of alibi or of insanity or mental infirmity.
Similarly, the defendant must notify the prosecutor if he expects to plead a
defense of insanity, and the commonwealth's duty to reciprocate is provided
by subsection C(1)(c).

77

If the defendant fails to file notice of either alibi defense or insanity
defense, or if the prosecutor fails to reciprocate when a notice is duly filed,
the court has the discretion to omit such evidence, to grant a continuance to
investigate the newly raised matter, or to fashion its own remedy:7 8
(d) Failure to File Notice: If the defendant fails to file and serve
notice of alibi defense or insanity or mental infirmity defense as
required by this rule, or omits any witness from such notice, the court at
trial may exclude the testimony of any omitted witness, or may exclude
entirely any evidence offered by the defendant for the purpose of
proving the defense, except testimony by the defendant, or may grant a
continuance to enable the Commonwealth to investigate such evidence,
or may make such other order as the interests of justice require.
(e) Failure to Supply Reciprocal Notice: If the attorney for the
Commonwealth fails to file and serve a list of its witnesses as required
by this rule, or omits any witness therefrom, the court at trial may
exclude the testimony of any omitted witness, or may exclude any
evidence offered by the Commonwealth for the purpose of disproving the
alibi, insanity or mental infirmity defense, or may grant a continuance
to enable the defense to investigate such evidence, or may make such
other order as the interests of justice require.7 9
Because of the fifth and sixth amendment problems, the defendant cannot
be prohibited from raising such defenses himself at trial even though he
failed to give notice:80
(g) Impeachment: A defendant may testify concerning an alibi
notwithstanding that the defendant has not filed notice, but if the
defendant has filed notice and testifies concerning his presence at the
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
PA. R. CRIM. P. 305C(1)(d), (e).
Id.
PA. R. CRIM. P. 305C(1)(g). To disallow defendant the right to testify at trial in

his own defense as a permissible sanction for violation of a rule of criminal procedure
would fly in the face of sixth amendment guarantees of the right to a fair trial and
fifth amendment guarantees of due process. U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI.

The American Bar Association indicated that such a provision would be
subject to constitutional limitations. ABA STANDARDS, Discovery and Procedure
Before Trial § 3.3 (1970). For a discussion of sixth amendment problems relating to
discovery, see Allis, Limitations on ProsecutorialDiscovery of the Defense Case in
Federal Courts: The Shield of Confidentiality, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 461, 507-10 (1977).
Note, The Conundrum of Criminal Discovery: Constitutional Arguments, ABA
Standards,Federal Rules, and Kentucky Law, 62 Ky. L. J. 800, 819-23 (1976).
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time of the offense at a place or time different from that specified in the
notice, the defendant may be cross-examined concerning such notice.81
If the defendant does not file notice of the defenses, and if the court
refuses to let his witnesses testify, the prosecution cannot argue, in response
to defendant's own testimony, that if the defendant were telling the truth, he
would have witnesses to back up his story and that the absence of such
2
witnesses gives rise to a strong inference that he is lying:
(f) Failure to Call Witnesses: No adverse inference may be drawn
against the defendant, nor may any comment be made concerning the
defendant's failure to call available alibi, insanity or mental infirmity
witnesses, when such witnesses have been prevented from testifying by
defendant's attorney shall
reason of this rule unless the defendant or the
83
attempt to explain such failure to the jury.
While subsection C(1)(f) prohibits such prosecutorial conduct,8 4 the prosecu-

tion is given no similar protection. If prosecution witnesses, called to refute
an alibi or insanity defense, are prevented from testifying because the
prosecutor failed to reciprocate under C(1)(c), 85 the defense counsel may

presumably use that absence of testimony to imply that the prosecutor is
unable to refute the defendant's defenses.
Following the mandatory provisions of rule 305C is a section which
provides that there are certain items that the court may, in the exercise of
discretion, order the defendant to produce:
(2) DISCRETIONARY WITH THE COURT: In all court cases, if the
Commonwealth files a motion for pretrial discovery, the court may order
the defendant, subject to the defendant's rights against compulsory selfincrimination, to allow the attorney for the Commonwealth to inspect
and copy or photograph any of the following requested items, upon a
of the Commonwealth's case
showing of materiality to the preparation
86
and that the request is reasonable:
There are three conditions which attach to this discretionary provision.
Initially, discovery of the material requested must not violate the defendant's constitutional right not to incriminate himself.87 Therefore, one could
assume that only material neutral on its face or favorable to the defendant
would be discoverable. An interesting question is whether evidence which is
seemingly neutral when defendant is compelled to produce it under this
section, but which becomes incriminating evidence as the result of
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

PA. R. CRIM. P. 305C(1)(g).
Id. 305C(1)(f).
Id.
Id.
Id. 305C(1)(c). See text accompanying note 76 supra.

86. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305C(2).

87. Id. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. See Allis, supra note 80, at 488-99; Louisell,
supra note 56, at 87-90; Note, supra note 80, at 810-19.
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8
investigation, could be suppressed at trial.1
A related question involves
discovery of neutral evidence which leads, through investigation, to
additional evidence which is in fact incriminating. 9 Would the evidence in
the latter situation be suppressed as the "fruit of the poisonous tree' ' 9 that is, evidence developed from other evidence which the defendant was
forced to give, arguably in violation of his fifth amendment right?91 Whether
or not future state criminal defendants will seek suppression of evidence on
these grounds remains to be seen.
Materiality and reasonableness are the other two conditions which must
be met by the prosecutor. 92 However, fulfilling these two conditions would
not be enough to compel disclosure by the defense of incriminatory
evidence. 93 It is only when the information sought is not incriminatory and
is material and reasonable that the court can use its discretionary powers to
94
permit or prohibit discovery.
Subsection C(2)(a) at first glance seems to track subsection B(1)(e) which
states that the defendant may get certain test results and reports from the
prosecution. 95 The following items may be discoverable under subsection

C(2)(a):

(a) results or reports of physical or mental examinations, and of
scientific tests or experiments made in connection with the particular
case, or copies thereof, within the possession or control of the defendant,
which the defendant intends to introduce as evidence in chief, or which
were prepared by a witness whom the defendant intends to call at the
trial, when results or reports relate to the testimony of that witness,
provided the defendant has requested and received discovery under
96
paragraph B(1)(e);

In fact, production of such information in the defendant's control will be
denied unless the defendant has requested and obtained such material from
the prosecution. 97 There is one factor on the face of the rule itself that
distinguishes subsection C(2)(a) from subsection B(1)(e); there are, in
addition, other differences between them. The obvious distinction is that
while the production of such reports is mandatory from prosecutor to
defendant, 9 it is only discretionary from defendant to prosecutor. 99 A
88. The comments following rule 305 contain the following statement: "This rule
is not intended to affect the admissibility of evidence discoverable under this rule or
the fruits thereof, nor the standing of the defendant to seek suppression of such
evidence." PA. R. CRIM. P. 305, Comment.
89. See id.
90. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
91. The evidence excluded in Wong Sun was developed subsequent to a fourth
amendment violation, id. at 484-91, but the analysis would be the same for fifth
amendment purposes.
92. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305C(2).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
96. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305C(2)(a).
97. Id.
98. Id. 305B(1)(e).
99. Id. 305C(2)(a).
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prosecutor must turn over all reports whether he plans to use them at trial or
not;10° the defendant need turn over only those which he plans to use at
trial.101 The prosecutor must turn over results of polygraph examinations
even though those results cannot be admitted as evidence at trial;10 2 should
the defendant submit to a private polygraph examination, there is no
provision that such a report could be discovered by the prosecution. 10
Subsection C(2)(b) is the reciprocal of B(2)(a), 04 and provides for the
production of names and addresses of eyewitnesses: 0 5
(b) the names and addresses of eyewitnesses whom the defendant
intends to call in its case in chief, provided that the defendant has
06
previously requested and received discovery under paragraph B(2)(a).
The defendant's duty to produce only the names of those eyewitnesses he
intends to call at trial 107 contrasts once again with the prosecutor's duty to
produce the names and addresses of all eyewitnesses. 0 8 There is no
requirement that the defendant provide the prosecutor with statements
made to him (or to his counsel) by the eyewitnesses. Such statements are
required from the prosecutor, if the court so orders, but only for those
eyewitnesses whom he expects to call at trial. 09 Like subsection C(2)(a)," 1°
C(2)(b) conditions a prosecutor's right to obtain discovery on a prior similar
request by the defense."'
4.

Continuing Duty to Disclose

Section D of the rule establishes a continuing duty to disclose even
during the course of the trial:
D. CONTINUING DUTY TO DISCLOSE:
If, prior to or during trial, either party discovers additional evidence or
material previously requested or ordered to be disclosed by it, which is
100. Id. 305B(1)(e).
101. Id. 305C(2)(a).
102. Id. 305B(1)(e).
103. This limitation makes sense in light of the constitutional limitations on the
scope of pretrial discovery flowing from defendant to prosecutor. One could assume
defendant would use all favorable evidence at trial, and that that evidence would be
discoverable. Compelling the production of inculpatory evidence would violate
defendant's fifth amendment rights. See Allis, supra note 80, at 488-99; Louisell,
supra note 56, at 87-90; Note, supra note 80, at 810-19. Such inculpatory evidence is
evidence which defendant would also not be expected to present at trial. Therefore,
limiting producible material to what defendant will use at trial is the same as saying
material whose production will not violate defendant's fifth amendment rights.
104. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(2)(a). See text accompanying note 57 supra.
105. PA. R. CraM. P. 305C(2)(b).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. 305B(2)(a).
109. Id.
110. Id. 305C(2)(a).
il. Id. 305C(2)(b).
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subject to discovery or inspection under this rule, or the identity of an
additional witness or witnesses, such party shall promptly notify the
opposing party or the court of the additional evidence, material or
11 2
witness.
Interestingly enough, the draftsman used in this provision the word
"witness" rather than "eyewitness." ' 13 Arguably, the witness discoverable
under this section must be an eyewitness discoverable under B(2)(a)' 14 or
C(2)(b), 115 but there is room to argue that since the witness clause follows the
conjunction "or" and is not modified by the phrase "subject to discovery or
inspection under this rule," that it, in fact, imposes an additional
116
affirmative duty on the parties.
5.

Remedy
117
Judicial choice of remedies is set forth in section E:

If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule,
the court may order such party to permit discovery or inspection, may
grant a continuance, or may prohibit such party from introducing
evidence not disclosed, other than testimony of the defendant, or it may
enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. ' 8
There is broad discretion lodged in the trial judge to select an appropriate
statutory remedy or to fashion a remedy to suit particular circumstances. 1 9
Such a remedy would always be subject to the defendant's fifth and sixth
amendment rights under the United States Constitution.' 20 Query whether
prohibiting defendant's witnesses from testifying as a sanction for the
defendant's failure to comply with a discovery order is violative of his sixth
2
amendment rights.' '
6.

Protective Orders

All the provisions of rule 305 are subject to the court's authority to grant
22
a protective order denying or limiting discovery in a particular instance:'

112. Id. 305D.
113. Id.
114. Id. 305B(2)(a).
115. Id. 305C(2)(b). See text accompanying notes 57 & 106 supra.
116. See text accompanying notes 67-69 supra.
117. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305E.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See note 80 supra.
121. Although the sixth amendment only guarantees compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, U.S. CONST. amend. VI, could it be argued that such
a guarantee, by implication, extends to the defendant the right to have favorable
witnesses testify if they exist? Whether or not defendant could be deprived of that
right by his own violation of a procedural rule is questionable.
122. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305F.
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Upon a sufficient showing, the court may at any time order that the
discovery or inspection be denied, restricted or deferred, or make such
other order as is appropriate. Upon motion of any party, the court may
permit the showing to be made, in whole or in part, in the form of a
written statement to be inspected by the court in camera. If the court
enters an order granting relief following a showing in camera, the entire
text of the statement shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the
court to be made available to the appellate court(s) in the event of an
123
appeal.
When will the court issue such a protective order? For what reasons will
such an order issue? What must be shown? What showing is sufficient? It is
clear that the rule makes no attempt to define circumstances which might
give rise to the issuance of a protective order. Whether courts will look for
25
124
or the state civil practice' will
guidance to the federal criminal practice
have to be determined as these rules are implemented.
7.

Work Product
126
The last section of rule 305 deals with the immunity of work product:

Disclosure shall not be required of legal research or of records,
correspondence, reports or memoranda to the extent that they contain
the opinions, theories or conclusions of the attorney for the Commonwealth or the attorney for the defense, or members of their legal
staffs.127
This provision is similar in scope to the absolute exception from discovery
given under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to "the mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative
of a party concerning the litigation.' 28 Nondiscoverable work product is
29
but
therefore limited by rule 305 to "opinions, theories or conclusions,"'
3
only as they are reflected in the product of lawyers.' 0 Excluded from this
exception are policemen, investigators, and other personnel who might be
involved in the case on either side. Any production of material or
information from one other than a lawyer will be discoverable or, at least,
will not be exempt from discovery because of the work product immunity.
Whether or not material properly defined as work product under this
provision would be discoverable in a case for which the work was not
3
specifically prepared is questionable. The state civil counterpart' ' to rule
305G has been so interpreted; that is, work product enjoys an absolute
123. Id.
124. See note 173
125. See note 179
126. PA. R. CRIM.
127. Id.
128. FED. R. Civ.
129. PA. R. CRIM.
130. Id.

and accompanying text infra.
and accompanying text infra.
P. 305G.
P. 26(b)(3).
P. 305G.

131. PA. R. Civ. P. 4011(d).
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immunity only to the extent that it is sought to be discovered in the
proceeding for which it was prepared. 1 32 The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, however, have been interpreted to grant absolute immunity to
"the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an
13 3
If
attorney" whenever the production of such material has been sought.
the former interpretation is adopted, that of limited immunity, it is possible
that prosecutors and defense lawyers will alter their mode of reporting for
fear that those reports will be discoverable in a subsequent proceeding, and
it is arguable that those alterations may adversely affect the efficiency and
3 4
quality of the criminal justice system.'

III.

THE FEDERAL RULE FOR PRETRIAL DISCOVERY
AND INSPECTION

The federal counterpart to the new Pennsylvania rule 305 is rule 16 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 13 Passed originally in 1946, it has
undergone several major amendments.' 36 The federal rule lists the items of
information that are subject to disclosure by the government.' 37 With the

exception of one, 138 all the provisions of this section of the federal rule are
mandatory, as evidenced by the phrase "the government shall," rather than
39
"the government may.'
The criminal defendant in a federal case may obtain his statement, not
only in written or recorded form but also in any form which reflects the
132. Grew v. Brunner, 1 D.&C.2d 754 (C.P. Phila. 1955); 5A R. ANDERSON,
PENNSYLVANIA

CIVIL PRACTICE § 4011.191 (1966).

133. See, e.g., United States v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 542 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1976);
Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 487 F.2d 480 (4th Cir. 1973);
LaRocca v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 47 F.R.D. 278 (W.D. Pa.
1969); Insurance Company of North America v. Union Carbide Corp., 35 F.R.D. 520
(D. Colo. 1964). But see Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 207 F.
Supp. 407 (M.D. Pa. 1962).
134. For one opinion of what effect discovery rules could have on prosecutorial
work product, see Louisell, supra note 56 at 91-92.
135. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
136. Although rule 16 was originally promulgated in 1946, the more liberalized
version did not appear until 1966. That rule was subsequently amended in 1974 and
1975. For the legislative history of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
Amendments Act of 1975, see H.R. REP. No. 94-247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1975),
reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 674, 684-88. Certain changes were
made by the House Conference Committee to the proposed amendments among which
was the elimination of the requirement to supply witness lists to opposing counse. See
H.R. REP. No. 94-414, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975), reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 713, 716. The report states:
A majority of the Conferees believe it is not in the interest of the effective
administration of criminal justice to require that the government or the
defendant be forced to reveal the names and addresses of its witnesses before
trial. Discouragement of witnesses and improper contacts directed at influencing
their testimony, were deemed paramount concerns in the formulation of this
policy.
Id. See C. WRIGHT, 1 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 251-261 (1969).
137. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A)-(D).
138. One sentence of Rule 16 begins thusly: "Where the defendant is a corporation,
partnership, association or labor union, the court may grant. . . discovery .
Id.
16(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
139. Id. 16(a)(1)(A)-(D).
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substance of any oral statement. 140 In this regard, rule 305 tracks the federal
rule.' 41 Under the federal rule, however, there are limitations placed on the
producibility of the substance of an oral statement. 142 The government must
intend to offer it in evidence at trial, and the statement must have been
made by the defendant in response to interrogation by a person known by
the defendant to be a government agent.' 43 No such limitations appear in
the Pennsylvania rule. 144 Any investigative report that contains interviews
with people who have talked with the defendant and who have revealed the
substance of those conversations could be subject to disclosure under the
state rule.145 The names and addresses of those people, whether or not they
are potential witnesses at trial, are discoverable as well.'46
The defendant's prior criminal record is discoverable under both the
federal and the Pennsylvania rules. 147 Access to documents and tangible
objects is more restricted under the Pennsylvania rule than under the federal
rule. Under the Pennsylvania rule, the defendant must always satisfy the
condition of materiality to the instant case before being granted access to
documents and tangible objects. 1' 8 Under the federal rule, however,
defendant may obtain access upon showing any one of three conditions materiality, the intention of the government to use the information at trial,
or the fact that such information was obtained from or belonged to the
defendant.' 49 The difference between the two rules may not be significant,
however, because the Pennsylvania courts could always define the
information falling into the second and third categories listed above as
"material to the instant case" for purposes of the Pennsylvania rule. By so
defining the scope of materiality, the courts would harmonize this provision
of the state rule with its federal counterpart.
140. Id. 16(a)(1)(A). In United States v. Lewis, 511 F.2d 798 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the

court held that the defendant was entitled to receive the substance of oral statements
which the defendant had made to a police officer which the police officer subsequently
orally reported to the prosecutor. Id. at 801-02.
141. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(1)(b). See notes 37-39 and accompanying text supra.

142.

FED.

R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A).

143. Id.
144. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(1)(b).
145. Id.
146. Id. See notes 37-39 and accompanying text supra. In United States v.
Feinberg, 502 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 926 (1975), the court of
appeals denied defendant access to statements made by him to third persons not on
the basis that such statements were not discoverable but on the basis that they were
protected by the Jencks Act. Id. at 1182. See note 170 infra.

The Pennsylvania rule relates to inculpatory statements only. Exculpatory

statements would be classified as Brady material and, therefore, do not need to be
subject to statutory compulsion. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1973); note 28
and accompanying text supra. Whether or not a statement which is neutral on its
face, but which leads to the discovery of inculpatory evidence or which provides the
missing link in a chain of inculpatory evidence is itself an inculpatory statement
subject to disclosure must await judicial determination.
147. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(B). See PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(1)(c) and text
accompanying note 40 supra. See also United States v. Johnson, 298 F. Supp. 58 (N.D.
Ill. 1969).
148. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(1), (1)(f). See text accompanying notes 24 & 40 supra.
149. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(C).
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The federal rule does not specify polygraph results in its provision
dealing with scientific reports and tests.'51 However, the language of the
provision is broad enough to allow the argument that a polygraph test was a
scientific test and that it was material to one's defense to inspect the results
of that test. By specifically including the reports of such tests in the new rule
305, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has indicated that such
5
information may not be excluded.' '
Section (a)(2) of rule 16 differs markedly from the Pennsylvania rule:
Information Not Subject to Disclosure. Except as provided in
paragraphs (A), (B), and (D) of subdivision (a)(1), this rule does not
authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other
internal government documents made by the attorney for the government or other government agents in connection with the investigation
or prosecution of the case, or of statements made by government
witnesses or prospective
government witnesses except as provided in 18
2
U.S.C. § 3500.'
More like its civil counterpart,' 53 the rule protects the work product of the
government's agents, not just the lawyers.154 It also protects against the
disclosure of statements of government witnesses, which are discoverable
under the Pennsylvania rule, at least when made by eyewitnesses' 55 and
conceivably when made by other witnesses. 156 Whether or not the federal
criminal defendant could obtain defense witnesses' statements made to the
5 7
prosecutor is not clear from reading the statute.'
What the Pennsylvania prosecutor has to disclose that his federal
counterpart arguably does not, therefore, are identification evidence, 58
transcripts and recordings of electronic surveillance, 15 9 names and addresses of eyewitnesses,'16 statements of eyewitnesses the prosecutor intends
150. Id. 16(a)(1)(D).
151. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(1)(e). See text accompanying note 40 supra.
152. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2).
153. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). See text accompanying note 128 supra.
154. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2). See text accompanying note 128 supra & notes
197-98 and accompanying text infra. The Supreme Court held in United States v.
Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975), that, even though a report prepared by a defense staff's
investigator would be work product within the meaning of rule 16, the immunity was
waived as to that report when the defense counsel called the investigator to testify to

events which were the subject of that report at trial. Id. at 238-39. The' Court

acknowledged that use at trial of materials subject to work product immunity would
not always constitute a waiver. Id. at 239 n.14. In Nobles, however, there was a waiver
of that immunity when the prosecutor attempted to make testimonial use of those
materials. Id.
155. PA. R. CraM. P. 305B(2)(b). See text accompanying note 62 supra.
156. See note 69 and accompanying text supra.
157. Section (a)(2) of rule 16 refers only to "statements made by government
witnesses" and is silent as to statements made by defense witnesses. FED. R. CRIM. P.
16(a)(2).
158. PA. R. CraM. P. 305B(1)(d). See text accompanying note 40 supra.
159. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(1)(g). See notes 51-55 and accompanying text supra.
Evidence of electronic surveillance has been held to be discoverable in the federal
courts, however. See United States v. Machi, 324 F. Supp. 153 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
160. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(2)(a). See text accompanying note 57 supra.
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to call at trial, 161 statements of codefendants and coconspirators,' 62 and
anything specific that might fall into the catchall provision defined as "any
163
other evidence."'
The federal criminal defendant need produce information only if he has
requested disclosure by the government and if the government has
complied. 64 His production of documents and tangible objects or examinations and tests need only be those that he plans to use or introduce at
trial.' 16 This makes sense when one stops to think that the defendant will
usually use all favorable evidence at trial, and no unfavorable evidence
could be compelled from him in any event because of his fifth amendment
privilege. 166 Unlike the Pennsylvania rule, the work product immunity of the
federal rule extends to agents of defense counsel.1 67 Statements made by any
6
witnesses, government or defense, are not discoverable under the rule.' Of
course, both sides may obtain statements from all of the witnesses by
interviewing them, 169 but those statements need not be turned over to the
opposing counsel until and unless that witness has testified at trial.'70
The continuing duty to disclose under the federal rule' 7 ' is almost
identical to that under rule 305 except for the clause in rule 305 relating to
additional witnesses. 72 Similarly, the federal remedy and protective order
provisions have been incorporated in the new state rule almost word for
word.'13

161. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(2)(b). See text accompanying note 57 supra; note 62 and
accompanying text supra.
162. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(2)(c). See text accompanying note 57 supra. See also
United States v. Ahmad, 329 F. Supp. 292 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
163. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(2)(d). See text accompanying note 57 supra and note 69
and accompanying text supra.
164. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(A)-(B).
165. Id.
166. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See note 103 supra.
167. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(2).

168. Id.
169. See note 177 and accompanying text infra.
170. The Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1970). Subsection (a) reads:
(a) In any criminal proceeding brought by the United States, no statement
or report in the possession of the United States which was made by a
Government witness or prospective Government witness (other than the
defendant) shall be the subject of subpoena [sic], discovery, or inspection until
said witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case.
Id. The act derives its name from the case of Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657
(1957), in which the Supreme Court held that counsel for defendant Jencks, who was
being tried for filing a false non-Communist affidavit under the Taft-Hartley Act,
should have been given the statement of an F.B.I. informant to use in his crossexamination of that prosecution witness. Id. at 668-69. See also Rooney & Evans,
Let's Rethink the Jencks Act and Federal Criminal Discovery, 62 A.B.A.J. 1313-16
(1976).
171. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(c).
172. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305D. See text accompanying note 112 supra.
173. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(1)-(2); PA. R. CRIM. P. 305E-F. See also text
accompanying notes 118 & 123.
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DISCOVERY RULES IN CIVIL PROCEDURE

Pretrial discovery is not new in civil litigation. Discovery rules at both
the state 7 4 and federal 175 levels have long been subjected to judicial
interpretation. Whether state judges applying the rules to criminal cases will
adopt some of the policies heretofore expounded in civil cases remains to be
seen.
The most noticeable difference between rules of civil procedure and rules
of criminal procedure is that most pretrial discovery in civil litigation is
accomplished through the use of depositions. 17 6 In criminal proceedings,
both defendant and prosecutor are free to question witnesses without
permission from each other. 177 Of course, the identity of those witnesses may
be unknown by the other side, which is why such information arguably
17
should be subject to the new criminal discovery rule.
Unlike rule 305, rule 4011 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure
details specific instances when discovery will not be permitted and when a
protective order should issue. 7 9 One type of discovery prohibited is that
which "would disclose the existence or location of reports, memoranda,
statements, information or other things made or secured by any person or
party in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial or would obtain
any such thing from a party or his insurer, or the attorney or agent of either
of them other than information as to the identity or whereabouts of
witnesses. .

. ."18

Not only are mental impressions of lawyers protected by

174. PA. R. Civ. P. 4001-4025.
175. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.

176. In the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure relating to depositions and
discovery, rules 4002, 4003, 4004, 4007, 4015, 4016, 4017.1, and 4020 all deal
specifically with depositions. Similarly, in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rules
27, 28, 30, 31, and 32 refer specifically to depositions.
177. Commonwealth v. Mullen, 460 Pa. 336, 333 A.2d 755 (1975) (held that
permitting a defendant to call prospective prosecution witnesses at a preliminary
hearing does not conflict with rules relating to discovery in criminal cases as those
rules are inapplicable to such a situation); Lewis v. Court of Common Pleas of
Lebanon County, 436 Pa. 296, 260 A.2d 184 (1969) (held that rule of pretrial discovery
in criminal cases does not apply where defendant seeks pretrial interview with a
prosecution witness, and that in the absence of "exceptional circumstances or
compelling reasons," the prosecution may not interfere with such an interview).
178. See note 69 and accompanying text supra.
179. PA. R. Civ. P. 4011. The rule reads, in part, as follows:
No discovery or inspection shall be permitted which
(a) is sought in bad faith;
(b) causes unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, expense or oppression
to the deponent or any person or party;
(c) relates to matter which is privileged or would require the disclosure of
any secret process, development or research;
(e) would require the making of an unreasonable investigation by the
deponent or any party or witness; or
(f) would require a deponent, whether or not a party, to give an opinion as
an expert witness, over his objection.
Id.
180. Id. 4011(d).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1978

25

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 3
1977-1978]

COMMENTS

this provision,' 8 ' but any product of any person prepared in anticipation of
trial is protected.18 2 For example, statements of eyewitnesses which are not
in a lawyer's work product and are, therefore, discoverable under the new
rules of criminal procedure18 3 might not be discoverable under the state civil
rules if they were in a report protected by this broader work product
provision. 8 1 As stated earlier, the state civil rule has been held to provide
immunity only in the particular proceeding for which the work was done,
with the result that such work product would lose its immunity at the end of
that litigation. 185 The new rules of criminal procedure relating to discovery
immunize far less material than the rules of civil procedure because the
criminal rules restrict those classes of people covered by the work product
86
immunity, thus reducing the application of this provision.1
At the federal level, much of civil pretrial procedure involves rules
controlling the taking of depositions and the use of those depositions at
trial. 7 Like the state rules of civil procedure, the federal rules include a
scope provision 8 - any material which is privileged is exempt from
discovery. 8 9 Although rule 305 is silent about privileged information, one
could'reason that such information would be the proper subject of a
protective order." 9° The attorney-client privilege and several others are
protected by statute in Pennsylvania.191 It follows that these and the other
181. Id. See text accompanying notes 127-29 supra and text accompanying note
201 infra.
182. Id. See Pottstown Daily News Publishing Co. v. Pottstown Broadcasting Co.,
80 Montg. Co. L. Rep. 114 (1962), aff'd on other grounds, 411 Pa. 383, 192 A.2d 657
(1963).
183. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(2)(b). See text accompanying notes 57 & 62 supra.
184. See text accompanying note 180 supra.
185. Grew v. Brunner, 1 D.&D.2d 754 (C.P.Phila. 1955). See also text accompanying notes 131 & 132 supra. But see Trzesniowski v. Erie Ins. Exch., 59 D.&C.2d 44
(C.P. Mercer 1973) (court indicated that work product immunity might cover material
prepared for prior litigation and sought to be discovered in a subsequent action).
186. See text accompanying notes 129 & 130 supra.
187. FED. R. Civ. P. 27-28, 30-32. See note 176 supra.
188. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b). See PA. R. Civ. P. 4011.
189. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
190. The state rules of civil procedure specifically protect privileged matter. PA. R.
Civ. P. 4011(c). See note 179 supra. No such provision is found in rule 305. In the
comments following rule 305, the court suggests that "[iln determining the extent to
which pretrial discovery should be ordered . . ., judges [might] be guided by the...
general principles of the ABA Standards Relating to Discovery and ProcedureBefore
Trial (Approved Draft, 1970)." PA. R. CRIM. P. 305, Comment.
The court then quotes the following section from the ABA Standards:
In order to provide adequate information for informed pleas, expedite trials,
minimize surprise, afford opportunity for effective cross-examination, and meet
the requirements of due process, discovery prior to trial should be as full and free
as possible consistent with protection of persons, effective law enforcement, the
adversary system, and national security.
PA. R. CRIM. P. 305, Comment, quoting ABA STANDARDS, Discovery and Procedure
Before Trial § 1.2 (1970). For a discussion of privileged information in relationship to
rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, see Allis, supra note 80, at 502-04.
191. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 321 (Purdon 1958) (attorney-client privilege); Id. § 330
(Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-79) (newspaper reporter's privilege); Id. § 331 (Purdon Cum.
Supp. 1978-79) (clergyman-penitent privilege); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §9.11(a) (Purdon
Cum. Supp. 1978-79) (accountant-client privilege).
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common law privileges could be invoked to block access to certain
9 2

information.1

There is a caveat in the federal rule relating to the admissibility of
evidence at trial:1 9 3 Information sought through discovery does not have to
be admissible at trial as long as it is reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.' 94 Not only does the new rule 305 not
provide this limitation, but it specifically mandates the production of certain
items which are not or may not be admissible at trial, such as the
1
'9 5
and results of polygraph tests.
defendant's prior record

96

The work product exception in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
much more liberal in its scope than its counterpart in the state criminal
rules, and more liberal in the extent of its duration than its counterpart in
the state civil rules.' 7 It extends the immunity to a "party's representative
(including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or
agent)."' 19 Rule 305 limits the immunity to lawyers, 199 while the state rules
of civil procedure extend the immunity to "any person or party. 211° Only
"mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories" are subject to
absolute immunity under the federal civil rule 2 1 and new rule 305.202 The
192. Such common law privileges would be the husband-wife privilege (see Hinter's
Appeal, 54 Pa. 110 (1867)), the juror's privilege (see Groner v. Knights of Maccabees,
265 Pa. 129, 108 A. 437 (1919)), a public officer's privilege (see Appeal of Hartranft, 85
Pa. 433, 4 A. 479 (1877)), and a trade secrets privilege (see Huessener v. Fishel &
Marks Co., 281 Pa. 535, 127 A. 139 (1924)). Although there is a statute which provides
for limited physician-patient privilege (see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28 § 328 (Purdon 1958)),
there is no such privilege by virtue of common law in criminal cases. Commonwealth
v. Edwards, 318 Pa. 1,178 A. 20 (1935). See also M. BROWN, PENNSYLVANIA EVIDENCE
263-72 (1949 & Supp. 1974).
193. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The provision reads: "It is not ground for objection
that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Id.
194. Id. See Burns v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973); Mellon v.
Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 424 F.2d 499 (6th Cir. 1970).
195. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §711 (Purdon 1964) (defendant's prior record
inadmissible). See PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(1)(c).
196. See Commonwealth v. Camim, 443 Pa. 253, 277 A.2d 325 (1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1046 (1972); Commonwealth v. Saunders, 386 Pa. 149, 125 A.2d 442 (1956).
197. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). The rule states in part:
Trial Preparation:Materials.Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of
this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things
otherwise discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in
anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other
party's representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor,
insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has
substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is
unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the
materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the
required showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or
other representative of a party concerning the litigation.
Id.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id.
PA. R. CRIM. P. 305G. See text accompanying notes 127 & 130 supra.
PA. R. Civ. P. 4011(d). See text accompanying notes 180-82 supra.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
See text accompanying notes 127 & 130 supra.
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federal rule immunizes that work, however, when it is produced by lawyers
or nonlawyers, while the.state law limits immunization only to lawyers. 2 3
Although the federal rule is silent on its face as to the duration of the
immunity, the courts have interpreted this absolute immunity to protect
such work product even in subsequent litigation. 20 4 As stated earlier, the
state civil rule has been interpreted as applying the immunity only to the
instant litigation. 20 5 The United States Supreme Court in Hickman v.
Taylor2°6 indicated in dictum that this narrowly defined segment of work
product - mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories should be protected in subsequent litigation; 20 7 an interpretation of the new
rule 305 consistent with the dictum in Hickman would seem to be more
prudent than one that would limit immunity to the litigation for which it
was prepared.
The federal rule regarding expert witnesses 2 8 is far more restrictive
than the new state criminal rule.209 At the federal civil level, only those
experts who are to be called at trial are subject to discovery procedures.21 In
2
rule 305, all expert opinions and reports are subject to discovery. 11
Although the federal rule is less specific about the propriety of a
protective order 212 than the state civil rule, 21 3 it is more specific than rule
305.214 The federal rule reads:

(c) Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person
from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in
which the action is pending .

.

. may make any order which justice

requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense .... 215
Compare this with the phrase "upon a sufficient showing" which introduces
the protective order provisions under rule 305.216 It is conceivable that the
state courts might look to the federal rule as an aid in defining the
203. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305G. See text accompanying notes 130, 197 & 198 supra.
204. See generally cases cited note 133 supra. See also text accompanying note 133
supra.
205. Grew v. Brunner, 1 D.&C.2d 754 (C.P. Phila. 1955). See text accompanying
notes 131-32 & 185 supra.
206. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
207. Id. at 509-14.
208. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4).
209. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(1)(e). See text accompanying note 40 supra.
210. Federal rule 26(b)(4)(B) provides the exception to this rule. FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(4)(B). To compel discovery from an expert not expected to appear at trial,
however, one must prove exceptional circumstances. Id. See Inspiration Consol.
Copper Co. v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 60 F.R.D. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 11 (N.D. Ill. 1972). But see Nevels v. Ford Motor
Co., 439 F.2d 251, 256 (5th Cir. 1971).
211. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305B(e).
212. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
213. PA. R. Civ. P. 4011. See note 179 and accompanying text supra.
214. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305F. See text accompanying note 123 supra.
215. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
216. PA. R. CRIM. P. 305F. See text accompanying note 123 supra.
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circumstances which would satisfy the requirements of "a sufficient
showing."
Whether or not the judicial interpretations that have followed the
promulgation of rules of civil procedure at the federal and state levels will be
made applicable to rule 305 as the courts apply it is open to speculation. The
civil and criminal proceedings are diverse entities, and any procedural rules
must be predicated on different assumptions. 217 In civil proceedings, true
adversaries come to court to settle disputds between them. Criminal
proceedings, however, require that the prosecutor be the representative of
the commonwealth, not only as an adversary of the accused, but also as a
"doer of justice. ' 218 The concept of fairness in civil litigation takes on an air
of convenience to the parties, but in criminal proceedings, the concept
expands to constitutional dimensions.219 It is submitted that the courts
should recognize that, although the concept of criminal discovery rules
evolved from the use of such procedures in civil litigation, 220 the criminal
rules function in an expanded arena. The criminal rules, although they
purport to establish only procedure, must be interpreted and applied not as
the civil rules, but in a manner which reflects and admits of their true
substantive nature.
V.

CONCLUSION

What does rule 305"mean to the criminal justice system? As yet there is
no answer to this question, although one may offer predictions based upon
the many studies and evaluations of liberalizing criminal discovery rules in
2 21
other forums.
One commentator recently stated the problem thusly:
Few problems of litigation today so intimately intermix practical, earthy
considerations of feasibility and "common sense" with jurisprudential
217. See DiJoseph Petition, 394 Pa. 19, 29-31, 145 A.2d 187, 191 (1958) (Bell, J.,
dissenting). See also ABA STANDARDS, The Prosecution Function, § 1.1 (1971); JOINT
COMMITTEE ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
AND THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE PROBLEM OF DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL

CASES 1-6 (1961).

218. ABA STANDARDS, The Prosecution Function, Introduction, § 1.1 (1971). See
also Lewis v. Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County, 436 Pa. 296, 300-01, 260
A.2d 184, 187 (1969).
219. See notes 32-36, 49, 87 & 121 and accompanying text supra.
220. For the historical development of rules of criminal procedure, see Fletcher,

PretrialDiscovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. REV. 293, 294-97 (1960).
221. Brennan, The CriminalProsecution:Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963
WASH. U.L.Q. 279; Everett, Discovery in Criminal Cases - In Search of a Standard,
1964 DUKE L.J. 477; Fletcher, supra note 220; Goldstein, The State and the Accused:
Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960); Krantz,
PretrialDiscovery in Criminal Cases: A Necessity for Fairand ImpartialJustice, 42
NEB. L. REV. 127 (1962); Louisell, supra note 56; Louisell, The Theory of Criminal
Discovery and the Practice of Criminal Law, 14 VAND. L. REV. 921 (1961); Traynor,
Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 228 (1964);
Developments in the Law - Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940, 1051-63 (1961);
Comment, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure- Expansion of
Discovery, 66 J. CRIM. L. 23 (1975); Note, supra note 80. See also Discovery in Federal
Criminal Cases, A Symposium at the Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia
Circuit, 33 F.R.D. 47 (1963).
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conundrums, as does that of discovery in criminal cases. Pity the trial
judge faced, on the one hand, with the burgeoning acceptability of
criminal discovery by his appellate masters, grounded in their
realization that any rational system of settling disputes, whether or not
adversary, must make available to the participants the underlying data;
and on the other hand, with his own honest belief that to grant the
discovery motion before him will faciliate all manner of evil conniving
by the defendant member of a notorious criminal enterprise. How can
the trial judge be rational, and at the same time, sensible? And how can
the appellate courts - or legislatures for that matter - establish guides
flexible enough to take account of realities, without committing the
matter to the trial judges' unfettered "discretion" - little more than a
bench wholly at large and
euphemistic slogan for leaving the trial
222
therefore, potentially, wholly arbitrary?
In general, the arguments proffered to maintain the status quo or to
restrict criminal discovery are that broader pretrial discovery would result in
a perjured defense, danger to and abuse of prospective prosecution
witnesses, and at most only unilateral discovery due to a criminal
223
defendant's fifth amendment privilege.
Countering such arguments are advocates of broader discovery rules
who believe that those arguments are based on faulty premises, and that
experience under liberalized rules in some jurisdictions has been successful
224
in proving just that.

In Pennsylvania, there are some who feel that the changes in the laws
which control the criminal justice system should be reviewed by the elected
representatives of the people. Representative D. Michael Fisher has
proposed, in House Bill 1490,225 that the state constitutional provision which
authorizes the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to prescribe certain
procedural rules for the administration of justice in the commonwealth 226 be
amended to require that rules of criminal procedure be submitted to the
judiciary committees of both houses for review. 227 A general review of all
criminal procedure rules now in effect is provided by a schedule following
228
the proposed amendment.

222. Louisell, supra note 56, at 56 (footnote omitted).
223. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 221, at 289; Louisell, supra note 56, at 87-101.
224. Krantz, supra note 221, at 138-39; Rooney & Evans, supra note 170, at
1315-16.
225. H.R. 1490, Pa. Legis. (1970).
226. PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c).
227. The following sentences would be added to the constitutional provision:
All rules of criminal procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to
this section shall be submitted by the Chief Justice to the General Assembly no
later than May 1 of each year and shall be referred to the judiciary committees of
both Houses. Such criminal rules shall take effect 90 days after their submission
unless the General Assembly expresses its intent to the contrary by concurrent
resolution and rejects them in whole or in part.
H.R. 1490, Pa. Legis. (1977).
228. The section provides:
One year after the effective date of this amendment, all rules of criminal
procedure previously adopted by the Supreme Court shall be deemed suspended
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As of January 1, 1978, the battle lines are drawn. On one side, there are
229
advocates of restrictive pretrial discovery rules for criminal procedure,
and, on the other side, there are those who argue to the contrary. 23 There
are also members of the commonwealth's body of elected representatives
who insist that the supreme court should not be the final arbiter of matters
of criminal procedure 231 - matters which arguably, though labelled
procedural, fall precipitously close to the constitutional limitation forbidding
232
the court to promulgate rules to enlarge or modify substantive rights.
Regardless of the fate of House Bill 1490,233 the new rule will go into
effect and would not be subject to the review procedure prescribed in the bill
until one year after the amendment had been passed.23 4 Therefore, the
criminal justice system will be forced to adapt to the new rule, at least
temporarily.
It is submitted that there will be very little change in the criminal justice
process for a number of reasons. Firstly, most trial courts have granted
discovery beyond the limits of the old rule 310. Secondly, prosecutors have
voluntarily allowed defense counsel access to the prosecution's evidence in
many situations either in a spirit of cooperation or to induce plea bargains.
Witnesses' statements, although not available to defense counsel before
trial, have been subject to production at trial at which time defense counsel
could ask for a continuance to give him the opportunity to study the
statement before continuing with the proceeding. Lastly, exculpatory
material is already constitutionally compelled by the United States
Constitution under the Brady doctrine.23 5 Under present operating procedures, the criminal defendant, although not statutorily entitled to broad
pretrial discovery nor to judicial or statutory remedies if such discovery is
not forthcoming, has, practically speaking, many of the advantages of
rather broad pretrial discovery.
Controversy over the new rule will most likely focus on the area of the
work product immunity. Under the new rule 305, the immunity is very
narrowly defined. 236 Only slight protection remains for the work product of
the prosecutorial team. How closely rule 305 will cut to the permissible edge
must be a question on the minds of many prosecutors.
unless submitted to the General Assembly for approval as provided in this
amendment within the one-year period.
Id.
229. See note 223 and accompanying text supra.
230. See note 224 and accompanying text supra.
231. See notes 225-28 and accompanying text supra.
232. For a case in which the court decided a matter first on substantive grounds violation of the federal constitution - and then, on remand, held that the prior
decision had been based upon procedural grounds solely within its supervisory
powers, see Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432, cert. granted,
vacated, remanded, 414 U.S. 808 (1973), on remand, 455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d 854
(addendum opinion), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974).
233. House Bill 1490 was reported out of the House Judiciary Committee by
Representative Berson on December 6, 1977. It was tabled, and, pursuant to House
Rule 22, was automatically reactivated 15 legislative days later.
234. See note 228 supra.
235. See note 28 supra.
236. See notes 126-34 and accompanying text supra.
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No one could rationally object to having as a goal a more efficient
system of criminal justice, but, in interjecting a new procedure, one must
take care not to upset the delicate balance between a criminal defendant's
right to a fair trial and the commonwealth's right, on behalf of its citizens,
to prosecute vigorously violations of the criminal law. To promote one over
the other by means of a procedural device is to do injustice to both.
Madeline Hartsell Lamb
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